We exploit the passage of the American Investor Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) as an exogenous shock to the informational environment of the firm and investigate institutional investors' preferences for information and firm disclosure. We find that more innovation disclosure causes an increase in firm-level institutional ownership of around 11%. This increase is mostly concentrated in institutions that actively trade on information (dedicated, quasi-indexers, short-term owners). By benefiting these institutions, innovation disclosure seems to enlarge the adverse selection gap between informed and uninformed market participants. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting a substitution effect between the degree of information disclosure to shareholders and the power they demand inside the corporation.
Introduction
Institutional investors, who own and manage a large portion of world equities, are the paradigm of active shareholders and one of the most important market participants (Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005) . Institutional investors are desirable not only from the firm efficiency perspective, but also in terms of aggregate welfare. In fact, many companies explicitly state their willingness to attract institutional investors using a broad set of tools (e.g., stock splits). A number of studies have highlighted the role of institutional owners in influencing firm governance and corporate policies. In this vein, the literature has established a preference of institutions for large, liquid, low-volatile, dividend-paying stocks with a good governance structure (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Appel et al., 2016) .
Despite the vast literature on the determinants of institutional ownership, the explicit preferences of institutions for highly transparent companies remains still under-explored. Previous related empirical works focus on how varying preferences for information impact firms' public information production and the trading environment (e.g., Healy, Hutton, and Palepu, 1999; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Sengupta and Zhang, 2015) , yet drawing causal inferences is challenging due to the endogenous relationship between ownership structure and information disclosure. It remains unclear whether institutional owners induce changes in the information environment or, instead, migrate towards firms with particular information characteristics (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Roberts and Whited, 2012) . In this vein, Boone and White (2015) examine the effect of institutional investors on firms information production using the annual reconstitution of the Russell 1000/2000 index as an instrument. They find that higher institutional ownership is associated with greater firms' subsequent information disclosure. Bird and Karolyi (2016) obtain similar results using the same regression discontinuity design and a novel dataset on 8-K filings in the period [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Positive shocks to institutional ownership increase the quantity, form, and quality of 8-K disclosure.
Even though the empirical evidence supports the notion of a positive impact of institutional ownership on subsequent firm disclosure, little is known about the ex-ante preferences of institutions for firms with higher levels of transparency. We use a novel quasi-natural experiment based on the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) to address this open empirical question. Using exogenous variation in the firms' innovative information environment, we show that higher firm-level transparency attracts institutional investors, and in particular those who are more prone to trade on informa-tion. Due to the arduous task of dealing with the associated endogeneity, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper studying the effect of information disclosure on firm's ownership structure.
Our main sample comprises public firms in the period 1996-2005. We gather information on firm's innovative activities from the patent data-set of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which contains all patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1976 to the end of 2006. We merge these data with the CRSP-Compustat Merged data on firm-level characteristics, as well as with the Thomson Reuters 13F data on institutional ownership to construct our main data-set, which consists on 18,561 firm-year observations.
We explore the effect of the passage of AIPA as a positive shock to the information environment of a firm via a differences-in-differences regression design. In economic terms, the passage of AIPA resulted in an increase in the level of institutional ownership by roughly 11%. We then investigate the type of institutions most attracted by more transparent firms. Consistent with innovative transparency decreasing the costs of becoming informed, we find that AIPA attracted more prominently institutions oriented to trade on information. This is, quasi-index and dedicated owners (in terms of Bushee, 1998) , and short-term institutions (in terms of Yan and Zhang, 2009) . We then study the consequences of this shock to adverse selection in the market, and find that enhancing disclosure seems to only benefit informed institutions (or those prone to become informed), thus increasing the adverse selection gap between informed and uninformed parties, which is reflected by a positive (i.e., increasing) effect of AIPA on market measures of adverse selection (bid-ask spreads and probability of informed trading). Additionally, we find evidence consistent with a substitution effect between firm transparency and shareholder power. When shareholders have easier access to information about company prospects, they demand less power within the corporation, resulting in higher managerial entrenchment. This result provides evidence of a bargaining between shareholder and managers, consistent with the results in Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) , who find a substitution effect between price informativeness of the stock and shareholders demand for power in the board of directors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss our sample and research design in Section 2. Section 3 details our main empirical results. We present additional analyses of the effect of AIPA on market adverse selection and mechanisms that channel the effect in Section 4. We conclude with a discussion of our results in Section 5. We exploit the pass of the American Inventor Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) as an exogenous shock to firm transparency. Historically, the U.S. patent system had a special feature compared to the rest of the world (e.g., Europe or Japan). Before 1999, patent applications in the U.S. were disclosed only after a patent was granted (Gallini, 2002) . Taking advantage of this feature, companies could hide their technological information during the application process, as patent grants could take up to 20 years (Graham and Hegde, 2015) . As a result, with the old regulation, high-tech firms could have complete discretion on the information they disclose, as well as to which investors and when to do so. In 1999, the Congress passed a new patent law -known as the American Inventor Protection Act (AIPA) -that harmonized U.S. patent law with the rest of the world. The new legislation required public disclosure of all the patent applications filed in the U.S. within 18 months after the initial filing date, regardless of the patent grant situation.
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AIPA became effective on November, 29, 2000 and supposed a major shock to the firm's information environment.
2 Arguably, the effect of AIPA is likely to be mitigated for firms that were already subject to the 18-month publication requirement, as it is the case for those companies that perform foreign patenting. However, publication in foreign countries is not equivalent to U.S. publication (Hegde and Luo, 2017) due to limited availability of data linking foreign and national patents as well as the resource and time constraints that restrict U.S. investors and competitors search for international publications. The degree to which firms decide upon secrecy prior to AIPA is highly dependent on industry characteristics such the proprietary cost of rivals obtaining certain technological knowledge (Hall, Helmers, Rogers, and Sena, 2014) . This is a special concern if the patent is not eventually granted, as the firm does not receive intellectual property protection, nor is able to keep the knowledge in-house. On the other hand, differences in disclosure times may also attend to non-strategic reasons, but technical complexities in the patent-review process. For instance, Graham and Hegde (2015) report inventors in computer and telecommunication technologies more likely to maintain secrecy than 1 Even in the Post-AIPA era firms could maintain patent secrecy by employing foreign patenting. Nonetheless, according to Graham and Hegde (2015) the proportion of inventors doing so is smallone-digit percentage.
2 For a complete description of the legislative process behind AIPA, see Ergenzinger Jr (2006) . drugs and chemical industries for reasons related to cross-licensing, fencing, litigation, or submarine patenting. Thus, the effect of AIPA on firm transparency is likely going to be determined by industry conditions. Firms that belong to industries with historically longer delays from filing to patent grant are going to be more heavily affected by the passage of AIPA than firms in industries that already had a low historical delay from filing to grant. Consequently, we define our continuous treatment measure as the average time lag between patent applications and grant for each publicly listed firm in SIC-2 industry code during the pre-AIPA period 1996-2000. We check that this variable is not inherently related to the institutional ownership level of the firm (correlation -0.074) in order to guarantee that pre-treatment differences do not drive the results.
Research design
In order to investigate how an increase in firm transparency affects institutional investors preferences, we perform a differences-in-differences analysis using the passage of the AIPA in 2000 as an exogenous shock to firm innovative disclosure. Specifically, we make use of the following regression specification:
where the dependent variable is the level of ownership by institutional investors in firm i on year t. T reatmment i is defined at the industry level (2-digit SIC code) as the average time lag between patent application and grant across all patents granted to publicly listed firms in the period 1996-2000. P ost t is a dummy variable for the post-AIPA period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Z i,t is a vector of firm-level, time-varying determinants of institutional ownership; and λ i and γ t account for firm and year fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors at the firm level to conservatively account for variation in institutional ownership at the firm level. Our results are also robust to industry clustering of the standard errors. Despite the use of an exogenous shock on firm transparency for our identification, and even though we include fixed effects that account for time-invariant firm characteristics, it could be the case that institutions are attracted by some time-varying firm-level feature not related to AIPA. To control for these effects we include firm-level variables such Market capitalization, Dividend yield, Capex over Assets, Sales, Firm Age, R&D expenditures over sales, Return on Assets, and the Capital to labor (K/L) ratio . We provide a comprehensive description of data sources and variable construction in the next section.
Given the specification in Eq. 1, the coefficient β 1 will measure the effect of a shock to firm transparency (AIPA) in firm-level institutional ownership. We use total institutional ownership for our baseline procedure, and then extend this specification to explore differences in the attractiveness of information disclosure to particular types of institutions such as Dedicated, Transient, or Quasi-indexers (in terms of Bushee, 1998) ; or depending on their investment horizon (short and long term institutions as in Yan and Zhang, 2009 ).
Data and sample
Our main sample comprises public firms in the period 1996-2005. We gather information on firm's innovative activities from the patent data-set of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which includes all patents awarded by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). We merge this data with the CRSP-Compustat Merged data on firm-level characteristics, as well as with the Thomson Reuters 13F data on institutional ownership to construct our main data-set. We apply usual filters and require firms to be reporting to CRSP for at least two years and have no missing values for total assets, sales, price and number of shares throughout the period. We also restrict the sample to firms that have at least one institutional owner filing the form 13F, and drop those firms where total institutional ownership exceeds 100%. Furthermore, we restrict the experiment to manufacturing companies (SIC codes between 2000 and 4000), which are the ones that are more prone to patenting and, therefore, most likely affected by AIPA. After all these filters, we are left with 18,561 firm-year observations. Table 1 contains the main summary statistics for the sample. We construct total institutional ownership as the total number of shares held by institutions over total shares outstanding at the end of the year. We use the Bushee (1998) investor classification to define the percentage of ownership held by each type of institution.
4 Similarly, we follow the procedure in Yan and Zhang (2009) to calculate the ownership of short-term (SIO) and long-term (LIO) oriented institutions. Lastly, we also calculate the percentage of ownership by the five types of institutions defined in the Thomson Reuters 13F filing (Banks, Insurance companies, Investment companies, Independent Investment Advisers, and Miscellaneous).
As firm-level control variables we include the firm market capitalization at the end of the year (Mkt value), Sales, Dividend yield, Capital expenditures over assets, firm Age, R&D expenditures over sales (R&D/Sales), return on assets (ROA), and capital to labor ratio (K/L).
Main results
We start investigating the effect of AIPA on firms' institutional ownership via a nonparametric approach. We argue a large and important effect of AIPA on firm transparency that affects institutional investors preferences that, consequently, should be observed in the time-series. Figure 1 contains the evolution of institutional ownership in treated and control firms. Given that we have a continuous treatment variable, we define the 'control' group as those firms that belong to industries least affect by AIPA (bottom 10% of our treatment variable), whereas our 'treated' firms are those in industries most affected by the passage of AIPA (top 90% of treatment variable).
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As shown in Figure 1 , there are clear pre-treatment differences in the level of institutional ownership in 'control' firms (more transparent prior to treatment) versus the 'treated' firms (more opaque prior to the passage of AIPA). These differences suppose roughly 10% higher ownership by institutions in firms that belong to the control group (40% vs. 30%). The passage of AIPA induces higher transparency in all firms, leading to the disappearance of these differences after year 2000. It is true, however, that institutional ownership in 'treated' firms starts climbing already by the end of year 1999, probably as a consequence of AIPA being enacted November 29, 1999 and institutions partially discounting its effect. 
Diff-in-diff approach
We explore more formally the effect of the natural quasi-experiment in a differencesin-differences regression framework. Table 2 contains the results from the effect of AIPA on firm-level total institutional ownership following the specification in Eq. 1. In column 1 we regress firm level institutional ownership on the treatment and the post-AIPA dummy variable, as well as firm and year fixed effects. We extend this specification in column 3 by incorporating firm-level controls. In addition to these OLS models, we run a Tobit model with year fixed effects in column 5. The coefficients of 0.128, 0.113 and 0.165 in columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively, are highly significant statistically (p-value<0.01) revealing a positive effect of firm transparency on the level of institutional ownership. Economically, the passage of AIPA attracted roughly 11% higher ownership by institutions. In order to ensure that these results are not attributable to pre-existing trends or any other inherent differences not related to the treatment, we conduct a placebo test. Specifically, we simulate a shock on year 1995 and estimate the placebo treatment during years 1990 to 1994. Due to data availability the number of observations is reduced to 17,748. Columns 2, 4 and 6 in Table 2 replicate the results in columns 1,3, and 5, respectively, using the placebo treatment. As shown by the statistically insignificant coefficients of 0.036, -0.042, and -0.056, respectively, the simulated treatment does not produce any significant effect on institutional ownership. These evidence supports the notion that the effects resulting from the AIPA treatment do not arise mechanically.
Types of institutions
We now turn to explore the effect of AIPA on the preferences of different kinds of institutions. Specifically, we start classifying institutions by type following the definition in Bushee (1998) , who distinguishes between Dedicated, Transient, and Quasi-indexer institutions. Dedicated institutions are those with low turnover and a concentrated portfolio, with little sensitivity to momentum trading. Transient owners have high portfolio turnover and diversification, and are prone to follow momentum trading techniques. Lastly, institutions whose trading replicates a buy-and-hold, index-following strategy with low turnover and high diversification are classified as Quasi-indexers.
Prior research studying the causal link between institutional ownership and subsequent firm disclosure has focused particularly on quasi-index institutions (Boone and White, 2015) or passive investors (Appel, Gormley, and Keim, 2016) , as these institutions have predilection for environments with low information asymmetries that facilitates monitoring and decreases transaction costs. In this same vein, we expect that, given their preferences, indexing institutions are also the ones most attracted by more transparent firms.
Columns 1,2, and 3 in Table 3 contain the results on the effect of the transparency shock on institutional ownership by dedicated, transient, and quasi-indexer owners, respectively. The positive and statistically significant coefficient (p-value<0.05) of 0.065 confirms our prediction of quasi-index institutions being more attracted to a reduction of the information asymmetries in the firm. The coefficient on ownership by dedicated institutions (0.035) is also significant statistically (p-value<0.1), consistent with the view of dedicated owners, who are typically monitoring shareholders, also benefiting from higher firm transparency. Lastly, we find an insignificant effect of the AIPA shock on ownership by transient institutions, as shown by the 0.014 coefficient in column 2.
Next, we investigate the effect of AIPA on ownership by institutions classified via their investment time-horizon. We make use of the procedure in Yan and Zhang (2009) to classify owners into long and short-term institutions according to their portfolio churn rate. Then, we calculate the level of ownership of these two types of institutions. Notes: This table presents differences in differences regression estimates on the effect of a pass in AIPA (American Investor Protection Act) on firm-level Institutional Ownership decomposed in three types of owners following Bushee (1998) and short-term (SIO) and long-term (LIO) owners following Yan and Zhang (2009) . All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level (in parentheses). * * * , * * and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Yan and Zhang (2009) find that short-term institutions are better informed and trade more actively on their private information than long-term institutions. Consequently, it should be short-term owners, who expend more resources in collecting, processing, and trading on information, the ones most benefited from an easing in informational costs.
We report the results from the effect of AIPA on short and long-term institutional ownership in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3, respectively. As shown by the highly significant coefficient (p-value<0.01) of 0.088, short-term owners are more attracted by a decrease of informational asymmetries in the firm. In turn, long-term institutions do not seem to react to changes in firm disclosure (statistically insignificant coefficient of 0.022), consistent with the view, sustained in Yan and Zhang (2009) , that long-term owners do not trade on the basis of information.
Mechanisms
We further investigate the effect of AIPA on firm-level measures of adverse selection. In particular we aim to unveil whether the informational shock of AIPA translates into a decrease of information asymmetries positive for all market participants or, in turn, entails just a reduction in the cost of acquiring information and, thus, only benefits institutions trading on information -as our primary results seem to suggest.
Analysts-based measures
We start by investigating the effect on analyst coverage and analysts' accuracy. If the information produced by AIPA translates into lower information asymmetries in the market and, ultimately, mitigates adverse selection, we should observe a positive effect of the shock into both of these measures. Table 4 contain the results from the effect of AIPA on the analyst-based measures of adverse selection. We include the effect on analyst coverage in column 1 of Table 4 , whereas the results for analysts' accuracy are in column 2. As shown by the positive and significant coefficient (p-value<0.01) of 2.952, the transparency shock improves analysts coverage in the firm. Nonetheless, this greater following does not translate into higher accuracy of analysts estimates (insignificant coefficient of -0.750). Combining these two results suggests that AIPA does not contribute greatly to mitigate overall information asymmetries in the market, and that the larger number of analyst following arises merely as a response of analyst brokerage houses to higher institutional ownership.
Stock-market measures
We now turn to investigate stock market measures of adverse selection. In particular, we focus on the relative bid-ask spread of the firm and the probability of informed trading (PIN) developed in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'hara (2002) . Our prior here is straightforward. If it is the case that the information disclosure forced by AIPA benefits all agents (informed and uninformed) we should observe a decrease in these adverse selection measures following the passage of the new law. On the other hand, if this disclosure is only favorable to agents trading on information, thus amplifying the gap between informed and uninformed parties, market-based measures of adverse selection will be heightened. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 contain the results from the effect of AIPA on the relative bid-ask spread and PIN, respectively. Both columns exhibit positive and significant coefficients (p-value<0.1), pointing to the view of information disclosure forced by AIPA being only favorable to informed parties. Rather than bringing information to all market participants, AIPA seems to lower the costs of searching, processing and trading on information for agents.
Managerial entrenchment
Motivated by these last results, specially the effect on PIN, we proceed to explore the effect of AIPA on managerial entrenchment. We aim to analyze whether higher price informativeness carried by AIPA acts as a substitute for direct managerial monitoring, as in Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) . In this paper, the authors find a substitution effect between price informativeness and board independence. This is, firms with more informative stock prices have less demanding board structures. We claim that this effect may also take place in our setting. When informed shareholders have easier access to information about company prospects, they may not need to exert close monitoring of the manager. To test this conjecture, we analyze the effect of AIPA on the entrenchment index (E-index) proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) . This index ranges from zero to six according to the existence in the firm's bylaws of six provisions related to shareholder power (staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and super-majority requirements for mergers and charter amendments). A higher value for the E-index corresponds to lower shareholder power (and, in turn, higher managerial discretion).
We provide the results from the effect of AIPA on managerial entrenchment in column 5 of Table 4 . Due to data availability issues, we use a reduced sample in this analysis based on 5,861 observations. Nonetheless, even with this reduced sample, we find a positive and significant effect of AIPA on managerial entrenchment, as shown by the coefficient of 0.532 (p-value<0.05). Taken together, these results point to the existence of a substitution effect between the firm's degree of information disclosure to shareholders, and the power they demand inside the corporation.
Discussion and conclusion
Institutional investors have long been recognized by managers, directors, and regulators among the most important market participants. Yet, there is still considerably little we know about their preferences for information and transparency in firms, probably due to the difficulty of establishing causal inferences. In this paper, we exploit the passage of the American Investors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA) as an exogenous shock to the firm's informational environment. We find that the higher firm innovative transparency induced by AIPA causes an increase in the levels of institutional ownership in the firm. Institutions trading on information (quasi-indexers, dedicated and short-term institutions) are more attracted by the increase in public disclosure. We investigate the mechanisms that drive these results and suggest that innovative disclosure is beneficial only for institutions actively trading on information. This asymmetric effect of information related to innovative activities seems to lead to higher adverse selection in the market by amplifying the gap between informed and uninformed parties. Lastly, we explore the substitution effect between shareholder access to information and managerial entrenchment. We find that in firms with higher levels of disclosure managers tend to enjoy more power.
While prior research (Boone and White, 2015; Bird and Karolyi, 2016) has documented an effect of institutional ownership on subsequently higher public disclosure by firms, we show that this is, at least, a two-way street.
